Producing Books that Matter; University Press Week, 2017

Admittedly, we like to think we’re unique. But, according to UPK Managing Editor Kelly Chrisman Jacques, the University Press of Kansas is different than many university presses (perhaps, especially, those that are larger).

“I didn’t realize how different our process is compared to the majority of other university presses, until I went to several AAUP meetings and talked with colleagues,” explains Managing Editor Kelly Chrisman Jacques. “Our production department is a cross-section of editing and design. Karl, our Art Director, designs all the book covers, ads, and marketing material. The manuscript and production team handles the editing and proofreading, and also the interior design of nearly all of our titles.”

Chrisman Jacques and her department, which includes Production Editor Larisa Martin and Production Assistant Colin Tripp, guide a manuscript from copy-editing to books in warehouse. All books are copy-edited and proofread by freelancers (“it’s so much more efficient for our staff size,” Chrisman Jacques explains), but trim, interior design, and layout are handled by her staff.

“We have a catalog of about 30 book layouts that are specific to our press,” she says. “When we receive a manuscript from the editorial department we have to ask how to best present the work. Some of our authors have established their work to a degree that they know what layout and typefaces we will use. Most of the time we work to make the layout the most efficient and attractive for the topic.”

While the staff at UPK is small and departments collaborate on projects, production staff and editors don’t cross lines often. Editor in Chief Joyce Harrison says her team of acquisition editors know how important it is to trust the production team.

It’s very important, because they know their side of the business so well,” Harrison says. “That allows us to know what we can and can’t promise authors, especially when it comes to schedules. Kelly’s team also works closely with the marketing department. So we all work together to produce outstanding books, but we have standards and schedules and plans that have to be followed.”

Chrisman Jacques and Harrison agree that the wild card in production isn’t design or typeface or a printing schedule… it’s authors.

“It’s critical for my team to have open and honest dialogue with the editors in order to keep authors on track,” Chrisman Jacques says. “We know that the editors will have our back if we have any issues with an author disagreeing with a copy edit or a layout choice. It’s nice to hear from an author who spoke to their editor and heard that, in fact, my team knows what we’re doing and have the author and the book’s best interest at heart.”

Authors at National Press Club Book Fair

A pair of UPK authors will be featured presenters at the National Press Club’s 2017 Book Fair & Authors’ Night on November 10 in Washington D.C.

Charles Calhoun will be signing copies of his critically acclaimed The Presidency of Ulysses S. Grant and Timothy LaPira will speaking with visitors about Revolving Door Lobbying, the book he co-wrote with Herschel F. Thomas III.

The books are among the nearly 90 titles selected by Politics & Prose, the District’s premier independent bookstore as the best of political publishing. The Capitol region’s premiere holiday book event is celebrating its 40th year! The National Press Club Journalism Institute is once again partnering with landmark local book seller Politics & Prose for a night of pols, pundits and prose.

Authors will be on hand to talk to their fans and sign books at this most exciting literary event of the season. Patrons can browse for books at the Club’s headquarters from 5:30 to 8:30 p.m. Tickets are $5 for NPC and Politics & Prose members; $10 public. Tickets will also be sold online and at the door.

The Book Fair is a fundraiser for The National Press Club Journalism Institute, a 501 (c) (3) charitable organization. The event helps the Institute’s programming and mission, which includes a competitive scholarship program with a focus on promoting diversity among the next generation of journalists, and training programs focusing on high standards, ethical conduct and best practices in a rapidly changing media environment.

CSPAN plans to feature books and authors on their programming.

Juliana v. Trump: Kids Fight Climate Change

By Dr. Elizabeth Blum[1], author of Love Canal Revisited; Race, Class, and Gender in Environmental Activism

On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Paris climate accords signed the previous year under President Barack Obama. Noting that “I can put no other consideration before the wellbeing of American citizens,” Trump justified his decision by stating that the accord “is simply the latest example of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States, to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American workers, who I love, and taxpayers to absorb the costs in terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories and vastly diminished economic problems.”[2]

The president’s decision came during a decade when polls revealed that many people, and young people in particular, emphasized climate change as a significant global problem. An Ipsos poll in 2015 noted that knowledge of the terms “global warming” and “climate change” were near universal among American eighth graders, who not only believed it to be a real phenomenon, but pointed fingers at using gasoline, cutting down trees, and creating electricity as major causes. The eighth graders also believed that adults and previous generations saddled them with a problem for their future.[3]  According to another poll taken four years earlier, the Nature Conservancy reported that “American youth are unhappy with the condition of the environment, and lack faith in adults to address it … A majority of American youth (51%) rate ‘the condition of the environment and nature’ as an ‘extremely serious’ or ‘very serious’ problem.”[4]

Seemingly paradoxically, at the same time adults note young people’s awareness of environmental issues, they also gnash teeth and decry children’s overreliance on technology and lack of interest in the outdoors. Concerned about youth “spending more time in front of screens than outside,” President Obama launched the Every Kid in a Park program, which granted every American fourth grader and their family free admission to all federal land.[5]  The National Park Service later announced the continuation of the program in subsequent years.[6]  Richard Louv’s bestselling Last Child in the Woods blamed computers and video games on children spending less time outdoors.  “Nature-deficit disorder,” as he described it, led to attention deficit disorder, along with other problems.[7]  Adults consistently blame modern technology as an impediment to young people “connecting” with nature.

A group of twenty-one young people, ranging in ages from 10-20, defied these prescriptive, stereotypical connections of modern technology with nature. With the help of committed lawyers and scientists, they filed a pathbreaking lawsuit in 2015. Styled Juliana vs. Trump, the case alleges that that the federal government violated the constitutional rights of young people in contributing to, and failing to act sufficiently against, climate change.[8] The plaintiffs, referred to as the “Climate 21,” demand that the court tell Congress and the President to devise and implement plans to alleviate the root causes of climate change.

Julia Olson, the main lawyer in the case, brought the children together as plaintiffs. Only a couple of months prior to the birth of her second son, Julia Olson sat through the documentary An Inconvenient Truth, which followed Al Gore giving his pathbreaking climate change talks. She remembers crying through most of the film, despite the fact that climate science was quite familiar to her as an environmental attorney. She felt overwhelmed by Gore’s message in the film, faced with the “added responsibility of ‘I’m bringing them [her children] into the world and I’m also leaving them with this planet that may not be safe for them.’” Faced with the film’s visceral message, Olson decided to act not only on behalf of her own children, but also for children globally and future generations.

Olson founded an organization called Our Children’s Trust, and began working toward a climate case, buoyed by a successful example of legal activism in the Philippines. [9] She specifically planned for children to be front and center, insisting that each plaintiff join the case of their own accord. Olson supported a view of legal activism as a path for children’s agency in the face of such an overwhelming problem as climate change. She noted that she teaches her children small measures, like refusing “plastic straws and toys with unnecessary packaging,” but realized that these typical adult prescriptions to environmental change simply lack effectiveness. “They’re going to need tools of how to live in [their] community and depend on people … and find ways to deal with the catastrophes that will come,” she notes.[10] Finding an empowered voice, as well as their place within a democratic republic reinforces that idea.

In most categories but geographic location, the young people Olson picked represent diverse characteristics. Eleven of the Climate 21 are from Oregon, and one hails from Washington state, making the Pacific Northwest overrepresented. Other areas have representation, though, with two plaintiffs from Colorado, and one each from Alaska, Hawaii, Florida, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and New York. The youngest plaintiff, Levi Draheim, is now 10, and was 8 when the lawsuit started; seven of the plaintiffs are now old enough to vote, and seven others are within two years at most of doing so. Gender and ethnicity show the greatest balance. The plaintiffs divide into 11 males, and 10 females. Almost half have non-white heritage, including African Americans, Native Americans, and Pacific Islanders. Overall, the case seeks most notably to demonstrate a broad array of inclusion, something for which the environmental movement has frequently been criticized.

The Climate 21 entered into the litigation for different reasons. Many of the plaintiffs come to their activism directly from their experiences in nature. Twenty-year-old Tia Hatton expressed a deep connection to the area near her home. She notes that “The sagebrush-filled desert skirts around [her home of Bend, Oregon], leading into National Forests, ancient rock formations, and vibrant rivers. This was my home growing up. The diverse landscapes of Bend became part of me … from a young age, I sought to protect this part of me.”[11]  Her enjoyment of Nordic skiing awoke her to the dangers of climate change, as she noticed snow levels regularly dropping. Levi Draheim, a 10-year-old boy from Indiatlantic, Florida, enjoyed going to the beaches regularly near his home. He watched and learned about progressive change in his area. He noted that “if the sea rises, our [home] could just be underwater. And our reefs … They’re just almost gone.  I can’t even go to the beach [anymore]. It gives me nightmares.”[12]  Deeply connected to the nature around their homes, Hatton and Draheim root their activism in dismay over real and future changes to places they love.

Jamie Lynn Butler of Arizona, and Jacob Lebel and Alex Loznak, both from Oregon, come from farming families. They each note that ever-increasing droughts and heat waves dramatically affected their families’ abilities to make a living. [13] Loznak noted that “during those heat waves, many of our trees died … We had plantations of timber trees that died. Some of our hazelnut trees died or needed intensive watering as a result.”[14] Butler remembers her family forced into selling off livestock when droughts made watering them prohibitive.[15] Contrary to Louv’s image of modern children as so unhealthily immersed with their technology, these young people demonstrate deep connections to nature that have informed and strengthened their beliefs in climate change. Rather than retreat into the world of video games, the Climate 21 chose to develop a political voice in the face of disenfranchisement.

In addition to a strong sense of place, many of the group also have deep interests in other environmental issues. Some pursue this through education. Hatton is an environmental and international studies major at the University of Oregon.[16] Senior Alex Loznak is a Sustainable Development major at Columbia University. Others have prior (and continuing) experience with activism. Jacob Lebel, a Canadian by birth who now lives in Eugene, Oregon, responded quickly to a threat by a Canadian company to build a natural gas pipeline close to his family’s farm. His activism helped to stop the plans for the pipeline. Expanding his geographical concern, he also protested at Standing Rock over the planned pipeline there.[17] Miko and Isaac Vergun participate in Plant for the Planet, a growing network of groups of children who help plant trees as a response to climate change.[18]  In 2014, Avery McRae (now 12), won a local award for raising more than $300 through a “fundraising party with games, crafts, and an introduction about the important role of salmon in the ecosystem.” She noted that her inspiration for the project came from “walking along Whitaker Creek … where she saw salmon spawning.”[19] Again, McRae demonstrates that her activism flowed from personal interactions with nature.

Families and culture provide an important entry point for activism for many of the young plaintiffs. Xiuhtezcatl Martinez, probably the most visible of the plaintiffs, cites his Aztec heritage as instilling a “sense of responsibility as a person to protect and connect and be a part of something.” Both of his parents also connected through activism – his mother founded an Earth Guardians school in Hawai’i and his father served as an Aztec “ambassador for Mexico.”[20] Through her extended family, New Yorker Victoria Barrett has viewed climate change both from the American perspective and the developing world. Even over her lifetime, her Honduran grandparents have steadily fought the rising levels of the sea near their home by building ever increasing barriers against flooding.[21]

Louisianan Jayden Foytlin followed the example of her mother, Cherri, in diving into activism. In 2010, “stage-managed trips” organized for the press by BP in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster frustrated journalist Cherri Foytlin. When she hired a fisherman to take her into the Gulf, they found a pelican drenched in oil that died soon after. Determined to take action, Cherri accepted the leadership of Bold Louisiana, a group fighting oil development expansion. Although Cherri worried about her daughter’s activism, she also saw it as a constructive way for Jayden to participate. [22] Similarly, Jamescita Peshlakai, a state senator in Arizona who has made climate and environmental issues key to her service, influenced her Navajo daughter Jamie Butler to be active.[23]

Importantly, many of the Climate 21 use social media and technology to promote their activism and views of climate change. The young people refuse the negative nature-technology dichotomy so loudly espoused by adults. Martinez, who aggressively uses social media and performs hip-hop music on climate change, makes this connection explicit. He notes that the “reason I’ve been able to have such a huge reach with the Earth Guardian movement is because of social media, and the way it connects us all as a global family.”[24] Jacob Lebel, along with many others, posts videos on youtube to publicize issues. Lead plaintiff Kelsey Juliana, Journey Zephier, Alex Loznak, Nathan Baring, and Kiran Oommen all have Twitter and/or Instagram accounts to spread news of their activism. Others regularly use crowdfunding sources to publicize and seek support for their work. Juliana requested “adoption” to fund her participation in a 2015 climate march across the country. Miko and Isaac Vergun, as well as Zephier, used gofundme accounts to assist in traveling to various conferences and training sessions. Their highly developed use of social media allows them to connect with peers – using a media that they find familiar. Rather than technology precluding interaction with the environment, young people use it to spread their message and safeguard nature.[25]

Although parents and other adults have often been supportive, some adults have a more negative reaction, often rooted in concerns that political activism challenges adult domination over children. For example, Jayden Foytlin of Rayne, Louisiana, lost her best friend over her involvement in the case.  Her friend’s mother stated that “I don’t want nothing to do with children being in adult situations nor will any of our children. I think it’s pathetic that a young girl is even involved in something like this.”[26]  A frequent commenter on CNN’s stories, Balatonian, noted that “Kids must just remain good boys and girls, go to school and study. When they become responsible and sensible adults, then they can participate in voting for and criticizing their adult peers.” [27]  In both of these instances, adults reflected fears of children stepping outside of prescribed roles as a subjugated class to “inappropriately” challenge adults.

The case has been weaving its way through the rather byzantine legal system over the past two years. Unlike earlier efforts, however, Juliana v. Trump has achieved some notable successes. Judge Thomas Coffin recently set a trial date of February 5, 2018.  Judge Ann Aiken upheld his decision, noting that the case “is of a different order than the typical environmental case.”[28] The Trump administration reacted to this setback by filing a writ of mandamus with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where they objected both to the “the unlawful exercise of [the court’s] jurisdiction” and “the staggering burden imposed on the federal government by the ongoing discovery” in the case. They asked  that the appellate court order the lower court to dismiss the case. The Climate 21 filed a response, and eight groups supported them with amicus briefs. All now simply await the Ninth Circuit’s response or the beginning of the trial.[29]

Regardless of the outcome of the case, the efforts of the Climate 21 provide a valuable lesson in how children perceive and interact with the environment. Although they lack a formal political voice in society, these (admittedly exceptional) young people chose to participate in a legal, peaceful protest to affect change. Their actions should remind adults that the 21st century’s children maintain an intimate connection to nature that technology helps guide and promote. The stereotypical image of our current generation of children as lessened by their contact with technology needs serious reappraisal.

[1] The author would like to thank her husband, Sean Blum, for his invaluable help in negotiating the legal wranglings of this case, as well as Karen Ross and Kathryn Tucker for their comments on earlier drafts.
[2] Callum Borchers and Amber Phillips, “Transcript:  President Trump’s Remarks on Leaving the Paris Climate Deal, Annotated,” Washington Post, June 1, 2017, accessed June 2, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/06/01/transcript-president-trumps-remarks-on-leaving-the-paris-climate-deal-annotated/?utm_term=.7bd77ccfc164.
[3] “Nine in Ten 8th Graders Agree that Climate Change is Real and Human Activity Significantly Contributes to Climate Change,” Ipsos, March 13, 2015, accessed February 3, 2017,  https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/nine-ten-8th-graders-agree-climate-change-real-and-human-activity-significantly-contributes-climate?language_content_entity=en-us.
[4] “Kids These Days:  Why is America’s Youth Staying Indoors?” The Nature Conservancy, accessed September 5, 2017, https://www.nature.org/newsfeatures/kids-in-nature/kids-in-nature-poll.xml .
[5] Arne Duncan, Sally Jewell, Tom Vilsack, Jo-Ellen Darcy, and Kathryn Sullivan, “Let’s Get Every Kid in a Park,” The White House, February 19, 2005, accessed June 24, 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/02/19/let-s-get-every-kid-park .
[6] Hannah Malvin, “Every Kid in a Park Program Extended; 4th Graders Get Free Park Admission,” The Wilderness Society, July 28, 2017, accessed August 1, 2017, http://wilderness.org/blog/every-kid-park-program-extended-4th-graders-get-free-park-admission.
[7] Richard Louv, Last Child in the Woods: Saving Our Children from Nature-Deficit Disorder (Chapel Hill:  Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 2006).
[8] Originally filed in 2015, President Obama’s administration were the initial defendants in the case. Trump inherited that role with the change in administrations.  The 2015 case is the second case headed by Olson of children filing a case against the federal government for inaction over climate change in the United States.  Numerous cases at the state level have also been filed, without much success.
[9] John Sutter, “Meet the Mom Litigating the ‘Biggest Case on the Planet,’” CNN, September 13, 2016, accessed June 15, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/12/opinions/sutter-julia-olson-climate-kids-profile/index.html .
[10] Sutter, “Meet the Mom Litigating the ‘Biggest Case on the Planet.’”
[11] Tia Hatton, Biographical entry, Planet Forward, accessed September 1, 2017, http://www.planetforward.org/users/tia-hatton .
[12] John Sutter, “Kids are taking the feds – and possibly Trump – to court over climate change,” CNN, November 10, 2016, accessed February 10, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/10/opinions/sutter-trump-climate-kids/index.html.
[13] Sutter, “Kids are taking the feds – and possibly Trump – to court over climate change.”
[14] Dana Varinsky, “Meet the Kids Suing the US Government for Ruining the Earth for Future Generations,” Business Insider, November 19, 2016, accessed September 3, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/kids-suing-government-for-climate-change-2016-11.
[15] Emery Cowan, “As Climate Lawsuit Faces Challenge, Navajo Teen Contributes from Afar,” Arizona Daily Sun, August 30, 2017, accessed September 3, 2017, http://azdailysun.com/news/local/as-climate-lawsuit-faces-challenge-navajo-teen-contributes-from-afar/article_d399f129-e92c-5abd-81d0-9ddb8e6dabd6.html.
[16] Joe McCarthy, “Meet Tia Hatton, a Global Citizen of  America Who’s Suing Trump Over Climate Change,” Global Citizen, March 17, 2017, accessed September 3, 2017, https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/global-citizen-of-america-tia-hatton/ .
[17] Kim Brunhuber, “Why A Canadian Teen Joined American Youth in Suing U.S. Over Climate Change,” CBS News, January 16, 2017, accessed August 1, 2017, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/lebel-lawsuit-climate-change-1.3931321 .
[18] “The Story of the First Oregon Academy,” January 12, 2015, accessed September 3, 2017, http://www.plant-for-the-planet.org/en/about-us/news/f1a2f4d7-9811-11e5-a0ac-902b34544d94.
[19] “Salmon Heroes,” Northwest Center for Alternatives to Pesticides, accessed August 26, 2017, http://www.pesticide.org/salmon_heroes .
[20]Zoe Loftus-Farren, “Xiuhtezcatl Martinez:  Youth Voices are Powerful,” Earth Island Journal, Spring, 2017, accessed July 13, 2017, http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/eij/article/xiuhtezcatl_martinez/ .
[21] Mike Pearl, “Meet One of the Teens Suing the Federal Government Over Global Warming,” Vice Magazine, November 10, 2015, accessed February 20, 2017, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kwxpde/meet-one-of-the-kids-suing-the-federal-government-over-global-warming-381.
[22] Neela Banerjee and Zahra Hirji, “Meet the Louisiana Teen Who is Suing the Federal Government Over Climate Change,” InsideClimate News, June 13, 2017, accessed August 25, 2017, http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2017/06/climate_change_lawsuit.html; Mark Hefflinger, “Over 400 Gulf Protectors Rally and Testify Against Bayou Bridge Pipeline at Public Hearing,” Bold Louisiana, January 13, 2017, accessed August 25, 2017, http://boldlouisiana.org/bbhearing/ .
[23] Emery  Cowan, “As Climate Lawsuit Faces Challenge, Navajo Teen  Contributes from Afar,” Arizona Daily Sun, August 30, 2017, Accessed September 1, 2017, http://azdailysun.com/news/local/as-climate-lawsuit-faces-challenge-navajo-teen-contributes-from-afar/article_d399f129-e92c-5abd-81d0-9ddb8e6dabd6.html.
[24]Loftus-Farren, “Xiuhtezcatl Martinez:  Youth Voices are Powerful.”
[25] “Kelsey Juliana,” The Great March for Climate Action, 2017, accessed September 1, 2017, http://climatemarch.org/kelsey-juliana/; Pam Vergun, “Vergun Plant for the Planet Germany,”  go fundme, June 4, 2016, accessed September 1, 2017, https://www.gofundme.com/VergunsToGermany.
[26] Neela Banerjee and Zahra Hirji, “Fighting Climate Change Can Be a Lonely Battle in Oil Country, Especially for a Kid,” Inside Climate News, June 13, 2017, accessed June 13, 2017, https://insideclimatenews.org/news/13062017/kids-climate-change-lawsuit-childrens-trust-jayden-foytlin-louisiana.   The negative reaction may also have stemmed from Rayne’s mostly conservative atmosphere:  many families rely on the oil industry for jobs, and complaints against the government may be more likely to be seen as unpatriotic
[27] Balatonin, comment, November 14, 2016, on Sutter, “Kids are taking the feds – and possibly Trump – to court over climate change.”
[28] Ann Coffin, Opinion and Order, United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Eugene Division,  November 10, 2016, page 52, accessed June 1, 2016, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/5824e85e6a49638292ddd1c9/1478813795912/Order+MTD.Aiken.pdf .
[29] A writ of mandamus allows the appellate court to review the decision of the trial court where proceedings are still ongoing.  For an outline of the progress of the case, as well as links to the legal filings, see the Our Children’s Trust website at:  https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/us/federal-lawsuit/ .

Celebrities Take a Knee: Athletes, Actors, and Musicians versus the Reality Show President

By Mark Harvey, author of Celebrity Influence; Politics, Persuasion, and Issue-Based Advocacy, available in November.

As any sports fan knows, playing “The Star Spangled Banner” is a time-honored ritual at the opening of American sporting events—a kind of moment of reverence and national prayer to respect the United States and its ideals. Last year, NFL fans watched while Colin Kaepernick of the San Francisco 49ers kneeled during the national anthem, claiming that he would not show respect for the flag or the country until it lived up to those ideals. Specifically, he expressed concern about the oppression of minorities in the United States.

Predictably, the action drew controversy from many football fans. Some came out in support of Kaepernick, while others argued passionately that athletes and celebrities had no place in politics. The controversy appeared to take a toll on the NFL. According to CBS Sports Chairman Sean McManus, the protests likely led to lower football ratings. Moreover, the controversy may well have alienated largely conservative owners of NFL teams who contributed 42 times more money to Republican causes over Democratic ones. Thus, despite Kaepernick’s strong performance in the 2016 season, team owners likely viewed Kaepernick and his protests as too explosive for the average armchair quarterback, denying him the opportunity to play football in the 2017 season.

As Kaepernick has fallen out, the NFL has joined in.

At a campaign rally in Alabama on September 22, Donald Trump—the former reality show celebrity and businessman who earned his political stripes by leading the birther movement and ultimately winning the presidency—argued that NFL owners who see players “disrespecting the flag” should say, “get that son of a bitch off the field right now. He’s fired!” By Sunday, alarmed players and owners alike collectively “took a knee” in support of players’ first amendment right to free expression, the very action that put Kaepernick in the proverbial hot seat. Even Shad Khan, the owner of the Jacksonville Jaguars—a man who donated $1 million to Trump’s inauguration—locked arms with his players during the demonstration at a game in London.

This controversy is only one of many celebrity-fueled political controversies during the Trump presidency. The NFL protests seemed to overshadow Stephen Curry and LeBron James’s criticism of Trump over the same weekend. Attacks on Trump have been a regular feature of entertainment award shows since Meryl Streep criticized Trump for being a “bully” at the Golden Globes. Mass protests such as the Women’s March on Washington have prominently featured celebrities. Even late night host Jimmy Kimmel has set aside his role as comic to advocate for universal health care, using his show as a platform.

What is going on here? Why is there such a proliferation of celebrity activism? More importantly, does it amount to anything? In my forthcoming book Celebrity Influence, I address these questions directly. What does our knowledge of celebrity influence tell us about the recent NFL controversy?

1. This is nothing new

Celebrity activism is not simply a knee-jerk reaction against Trump (pardon the pun). While Trump and Kaepernick, James and Curry, Kimmel and Streep are all important players in current political discourse, celebrity politics is not a new or unique feature of this Trump era. One of the greatest performers of his generation, Paul Robeson—singer, athlete, and the first African American to have a starring role in a film—was blacklisted in the 1950s for his affiliation as a communist, which informed his civil rights activism and appeals on behalf of the poor, starting in the 1930s. Popular singer Harry Belafonte was responsible for drawing attention to the activism of Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1950s and 1960s. In the early 1970s, John Lennon of the Beatles organized with Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, Bobby Seale, and others from the radical left in an effort to prevent Richard Nixon from being re-elected, while Elvis Presley secretly met with Nixon to discuss ways to counter young subversives. In 1992, the bands U2, Public Enemy, and Big Audio Dynamite worked with Greenpeace to protest the nuclear factory near Sellafield in the UK. For years, actor George Clooney has been involved in efforts to expose genocide in Darfur, and Angelina Jolie has been a UN Goodwill Ambassador working on behalf of refugees.

 

This brief list represents a fraction of celebrity political interventions. Kaepernick, the NFL, and others demonstrating on their behalf are part of a chain of celebrities that has spanned generations. However, one could also argue that the number of interventions have likely increased over the years. The more media saturated our society becomes, the more prominent celebrity activism seems to be as celebrities exploit their relationship with media outlets to spotlight causes.

2. There is strength in numbers

Data I gathered for Celebrity Influence suggests not only that celebrities are often more successful at generating attention for political issues, but that the more celebrities involved in an event, the more publicity gained. This stands to reason. A single actor may be a conscientious objector. A large group of celebrities makes a movement. Such was the case with Dr. King’s 1963 March on Washington, where dozens of musicians and actors arrived at the event and used it as an opportunity to isolate businesses that engaged in discriminatory practices. A generation later, dozens of celebrities came together in 1984 to record songs like “Do They Know It’s Christmas” and “We Are the World,” and to organize the massive Live Aid concert event to raise money and awareness of the famine in Ethiopia. Even the U.S. government responded to the effort by changing the type and amount of aid offered to developing countries in Africa.

 

Large numbers not only increase the profile of a movement—they also provide needed cover for more vulnerable celebrity activists. Keep in mind that the social and economic costs of activism are potentially quite significant for celebrities. The Beatles refused to play concerts in America before segregated audiences.  Given their incredible commercial power at the time, this decision changed the operations of the concert industry. But even the Beatles lost support in the American South for Paul McCartney’s statements against racism and John Lennon’s misunderstood lament that “the Beatles are more popular than Jesus.” Likewise, in 2003, just days before the run up to the Iraq War, the Dixie Chicks were excoriated for saying they were “ashamed that the President of the United States was from Texas” during their London tour, causing them a loss of popularity that they never completely regained.

This case of Kaepernick and the NFL making a political statement is exceptional. According to an analysis prepared for this book, athletes are quite possibly the most vulnerable celebrities when it comes to suffering retribution for protests. The likely reason has to do with the nature of their contracts. Musicians had the least invasive contracts from the 1960s onward as a result of the studios’ changing business model, which gave rock musicians more freedom in the studio. In contrast, film actors were employed exclusively by a single movie studio, television stars appeared on a single program, and athletes performed for a single team, which meant that the image of the stars were seen to reflect positively or negatively on the image of their organizations. While film actors became more autonomous by the 1970s, television actors and athletes continue to be reliant on commercial income for networks and on product endorsements. Athletes watched as professional boxer Muhammed Ali and Olympians Tommie Smith and John Carlos were socially, commercially, and even legally isolated for speaking out against the Vietnam War or inequality. Athletes feared being dropped by their teams or losing key commercial endorsements.

Kaepernick is a perfect case in point. He took a risk by being the first to “take a knee.” As long as Kaepernick was perceived as a threat to television ratings, he could not be allowed to continue in football. However, as long as the entire institution of professional football took a stand, such protest can be allowed. There is strength in numbers—and in the endorsement of owners and the NFL commissioner.

3. These protests have the potential to make a difference

Historically, celebrities who have challenged or worked with presidents may have led to changes in attitudes and even policy. When Arkansas National Guard troops prevented African American students from attending a newly integrated high school in Little Rock, jazz trumpeter Louis Armstrong criticized President Dwight Eisenhower for his weak response and refused to play in a goodwill concert in the Soviet Union. Eisenhower eventually sent 1,200 paratroopers from the 101st Airborne to force integration. Baseball player Jackie Robinson was a consistent critic of President John F. Kennedy for vacillating on inequality, and Kennedy eventually moved on civil rights legislation by 1963. Bono, lead singer of U2, had an ongoing lobbying and personal relationship with George W. Bush that culminated in debt relief and support for AIDS prevention and treatment in Africa. While one cannot easily prove that executive action would have been taken without these agents of change, one also cannot easily dismiss the popular pressure that was directed at these presidents as a result of celebrities shining a virtual spotlight on these issues and these presidents.

 

In addition, research for the book offered some interesting results that may tell us a bit about the effectiveness of the NFL protests. First, celebrities were more credible than many politicians on certain political issues and were highly persuasive. In particular, a level of expertise was afforded celebrities who were highly connected to transnational advocacy organizations, like Clooney and Jolie. Likewise, celebrities such as Elton John and Ellen DeGeneres were considered to be authentic on LGBT issues, likely because of their close personal identification with those issues.

Second, while partisans tended to view their own preferred politicians as credible on particularly divisive issues, people also found celebrities more credible than politicians from the opposing party. Thus, celebrities may have a mediating effect in political discourse. Since Watergate, Americans have become less trusting of politicians and American institutions. People believe that celebrities act independently of political self-interest, and may be more trustworthy as outsiders than those currently running the government. Considering these conclusions, it is no surprise that Candidate Trump’s appeals to elect an outsider who would “drain the swamp” would be so appealing to so many.

The NFL protests have the potential to be quite powerful if sustained. Will Trump be moved by players, coaches, and owners locking arms on behalf of free speech and civil rights? Probably not. Sometimes celebrity interventions fail. However, my research shows that these athletes may be quite persuasive to many other citizens and politicians. Indeed, since identity appears to be linked to one’s credibility on an issue, civil rights and free speech is a good match for NFL players. Seventy percent of NFL players are African American, so those black players locking arms with supportive white players have the potential to send an authentic and powerful message to a sympathetic American public. Perhaps it will continue to raise Americans’ awareness of the discrimination and violence that still plagues too many minorities in the United States.

And maybe we’ll see Colin Kaepernick throw the football once again.

Mark Harvey is the Director of Graduate and Undergraduate Programs at the University of Saint Mary, and the author of Celebrity Influence (out November 2017). You can follow him on Twitter and Facebook @DrMAHarvey.

The First Drink of Fall

When University Press of Kansas acquisitions editor Kim Hogeland contacted Pete Dulin with a book idea, he didn’t have to consider it for long.

“It was a pretty quick ‘yes’ from me,” Dulin says with his customary straight-forward fashion. “You want me to write a book examining all the breweries, wineries and distilleries across Kansas and Missouri? No problem.”

With Expedition of Thirst; Exploring Breweries, Wineries, and Distilleries Across the Heart of Kansas and Missouri, experienced Kansas City journalist Pete Dulin guides readers through a dizzying array of beverages made in America’s heartland. Expedition of Thirst maps routes that crisscross eastern Kansas and western Missouri, with stops at some 150 breweries, wineries, and distilleries along the way. Dulin, explains how and why these businesses produce beer, wine, and spirits tied to regional terroir and represent the flavors of the Midwest from the Flint Hills to the Ozarks. More than a travel guide, his book is a cultural journal exploring the people, places, and craft that make each destination distinct and noteworthy.

“This book was so much fun to write,” Dulin explains. “When I started I had no idea how many breweries and wineries were in Kansas and Missouri. It mirrors the national trend of growing craft breweries and wineries. In fact, there are now as many breweries in America now as there were before Prohibition – which has never happened before.”

Dulin’s travels for the book took him down back roads and across interstates; into tasting rooms and walking through vineyards. However, the assignment wasn’t a stretch. Dulin is the author of Kansas City Beer: A History of Brewing in the Heartland, KC Ale Trail, and Last Bite: 100 Simple Recipes from Kansas City’s Best Chefs and Cooks. His work has appeared in numerous publications, including Flatland, Feast Magazine, The Kansas City Star, Visit KC, River Front Times, The Boston Globe, Thinking Bigger, Pitch, and Kansas City Business Journal. He knows what he’s doing when talking about food and alcohol.

“I love the process of meeting small business owners who are so passionate about what they do,” Dulin says. “People that brew beer or distill whiskey or create wine are some of the most passionate people I’ve ever met.”

Dulin shares the stories of many of these brewers, winemakers, and distillers in their own words. Expedition of Thirst captures the character of the small business owners and makers and offers insight about their craft. For good measure, Dulin delves into the history, culture, and geography that have shaped these producers and their practices, from the impact of Prohibition to the early influence of immigrant winemakers and brewers, regional agriculture, and politics. As informative as it is engaging—even intoxicating—his Expedition is sure to work up readers’ thirst to travel and discover firsthand the singular regional pleasures Dulin so richly describes.

Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations in World War II

by C.J. Dick, author of “From Defeat to Victory” & “From Victory to Stalemate”

The philosopher Georg Hegel wrote that the only thing we learn from history is that we learn nothing from history. He undoubtedly had a point, but mostly because people so often do not make the effort to use history as a vehicle for leaning lessons. Of course, history is not usually written with a didactic purpose in mind and it is generally read it selectively for the myths it propagates or refutes. Many use it to prove their prejudices about which future courses of action to pursue, and to demonstrate that their opponents or rivals are mistaken; false analogy is perhaps the most common form of argument. I believe, however, that history can be used as a vehicle for instruction if done with care. That is why I have written my book.[I]

The genesis, and raison d’etre, of the book is to be found in army intelligence work I started doing in 1975 and later experience, which came with accumulating knowledge, advising BAOR HQs on ‘the threat’ and playing the Soviet enemy during command post exercises (CPXs). It became clear to me that, in the late seventies and early eighties, NATO and the Soviet Army were preparing for very different wars. It was evident that British and other allied generals on the central front were accustomed to accept as givens certain dangerous preconceptions, even illusions. Like most stereotypes, there was an element of truth in some of them. Others were more akin to truthiness. The more egregious of these conceptual errors, on which planning was based, included the following.

The Soviets, it was believed, placed almost total reliance on numerical superiority for victory. For this reason, no Soviet offensive could or would be mounted before mobilization and forward concentration and deployment were very far advanced. Largely for this reason, our generals mostly discounted the possibility of being surprised. The voluminous Soviet literature on the importance of surprise and how to achieve it was left unread or regarded as of purely historical interest. This was especially true of its stress on achieving victory in ‘the initial period of a war’, that is, by Soviet definition, the period of mobilization, concentration and deployment. Of course, there were other factors. There was a dangerous reliance on the certainty of intelligence providing timely warning of both the nature and scale of enemy preparations and, still more dubiously, of their raison d’etre. This error was compounded by an assumption that such warnings would immediately be acted on by NATO governments which would unanimously initiate timely counter-measures. In every CPX, supposed warning time (something actually recognized only in retrospect by historians) would be translated into adequate preparation time. There would be no question of a failure of political understanding or will to deter such as that shown by the Israeli government in the run up to the Arab attack in 1973, or the US before the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait in 1990. Quite probably, different perceptions in one or two allied governments on the central front would have acted in somewhat laggardly fashion and this would have created gaps or lightly held sections.[ii]

When the blow fell, the Warsaw Pact was routinely portrayed as attacking relatively evenly across the front, like the legendary but somewhat mythic ‘Russian steamroller’ of the Second World War. This reflected the assumption that the Soviets had an essentially attritional approach. Every exploitable axis would be used in frontal attacks by forces deeply echeloned so that the exhaustion of leading formations would not lessen the weight of the offensive or even lead to an operational pause. More cynically, this might also reflect a perceived need, both in appreciations (estimates) and on exercise, to give each central region corps a ‘fair’ share of the enemy. Certainly such simplistic teaching ignored the exhaustive Soviet analysis of the issues of force ratios and densities appropriate in various situations.

Most NATO corps were responsible for frontages that they considered uncomfortably wide. There was thus a temptation towards considering axes and obstacles where the going was difficult as being too problematic for an enemy that was obsessed by the need for tempo. Such areas were usually merely screened. This inevitably created vulnerabilities, especially if the enemy achieved partial surprise. Again, Soviet historical studies repeatedly emphasized the exploitation of unexpected axes as a method of wrong-footing their opponents.

On exercise, the Soviets were routinely portrayed as attacking prepared positions using hasty attacks mounted from the line of march. Such tactics were appropriate only on a fluid battlefield, where the situation was frequently and rapidly changing — circumstances often resulting from the attacker achieving surprise. Because NATO wanted a relatively static FEBA battle its armies mostly understood only imperfectly and did not train for the essential concept of the tactical meeting battle let alone the operational level meeting engagement.[iii] This was what the Soviet Army, by definition holding the initiative at the outset, expected to be the typical form of combat, perhaps even at the operational level if surprise were achieved and one or more allied contingents had not completed their deployment and fully occupied their FEBA positions. It devoted much training time to the meeting battle and produced a steady flow on the subject of books and articles in military journals.

Seduced by a comforting stereotype of the enemy as subject to a rigid, top-down command and control system, the allies denigrated his flexibility and asserted that his officers were generally incapable of exercising meaningful initiative. All that could be expected, of tactical commanders especially, was the mindless application of rigid tactical drills in all circumstances, however inappropriate. Furthermore, it was believed that attacks would be persevered with long after their culmination. For a defender facing superior numbers, this was a cozy piece of received wisdom that suggested his superior skill would carry the day. It was confirmed by only a very selective use of history.

Since the 1930s, a critical facet of the Red Army’s concept of the offensive was deep battle at the tactical level and deep operations at the higher level. Convincing themselves that they could win the attritional struggle for the FEBA and constrained by an arbitrary ‘no withdrawal behind line’ a very few tens of kilometers to the west, NATO exercise scenarios did not allow for any but small scale, local, tactical penetrations that were always contained. The fact that shifting the focus of combat into the rear areas of the defense was the essence of Soviet operational art seemed merely to prove to western minds a lack of realism in Soviet thinking.

The ability of Allied airpower to provide close air support at will, to compensate for Soviet numerical superiority, was largely taken for granted. So too was its ability to penetrate into the enemy’s operational depth to interdict his ‘follow-on forces’.[iv] Enemy air interdiction, complemented by special forces actions, was generally seen to be containable. It may well be true, as NATO air commanders asserted, that the alliance would have overcome superior Soviet numbers and won air superiority, over the course of time. It would probably not have been achieved in the, to the Soviets, critical initial period of the war.

The origins of these misconceptions can be traced to misinterpretations of the Russo-German war 1941-1945. As the Cold War took shape, western armies sought guidance on how to defeat Red Army offensives. They sought the advice of the vanquished about how to defeat the victor. Studies were commissioned examining tactically successful Wehrmacht battles and its generals were consulted and their memoirs read. Their common refrain was accepted, that their army was greatly superior qualitatively and doctrinally but unable to cope with the consequences of overwhelming enemy numbers and Hitler’s mistakes. Too little attention was paid to the frequent, latterly routine way in which tactically successful German formations were consumed in vast operational-level catastrophes. To give but one illustration. In the early 1980s, the Army Staff College at Camberley held up as an example to follow the XLVIII Panzer Corps’ defense of the River Chir in November-December 1942. The Staff College instructors were apparently unaware that the attacking Red Fifth Tank Army’s mission had intentionally morphed into a pinning action while Operation Little Saturn was accomplishing the destruction of Eighth Italian Army in a surprise offensive and thereby sealing the doom of even more German forces than those already encircled in Stalingrad. It was in their concepts of operational art and its execution, not in tactics or solely in numbers, that Soviet superiority lay. If the assumptions which underlie a doctrine are suspect, the doctrine must be questionable. Only objective analysis of the material available for study can lead to better conclusions.

When NATO moved from the doctrine of massive, nuclear retaliation to the notion of flexible response, its ability to fight conventionally became a crucial issue — at least when the Soviets too (and rather later) moved away from the belief that war with the West would be nuclear from the outset. Having embraced the belief that there could be at least a conventional phase in a war with the USSR, western armies continued down a conceptual cul-de-sac in their preparations to fight it. A major reason for this was the failure of its armies adequately to study and understand contemporary Soviet doctrinal writings.

To focus in on the British case, there were several reasons for this lacuna. The end of empire saw an increasing hollowing-out of the Army resulting from inflation combined with ongoing fiscal restraint and rising costs. Although the Army’s principal focus was theoretically on BAOR, from the early 1970s Northern Ireland proved a constant drain on manpower, money and intellectual effort and there were other distractions such as the Falklands war. There was little enthusiasm to provide resources for the study of Soviet military writings. It is clear, however, given the trivial financial cost of such study, that the real issue was lack of interest. The Army was comfortable with its stereotype, not least because it knew no better.

Being unfamiliar with an often very un-British approach to the conduct of battle and operations, the Army tended to squeeze Soviet concepts into the familiar molds of British ones and then point up the resulting bad fits as weaknesses. One example will make the point. The Soviet attack from the line of march was intended for meeting battles in which the enemy too was on the move or had only just transitioned to hasty defense. In British teaching and on exercise, the enemy was made to use the tactic against well-prepared defenses and suffered accordingly. Where the Soviets manifestly did things completely differently, it seemed self-evident that they must be wrong — after all, we were the ultimate in professionalism and therefore, by definition correct. The proof of this contention was plain from the great superiority shown over the Red Army in combat by the Wehrmacht. Western ideas were better.

At the root of this problem of incomprehension and consequent arrogant dismissiveness was the great hole in British (and American) military doctrine. Neither had an understanding of the concept of operational art, the conduct of war at the levels of theatre, army group and army in order to achieve the goals set by strategy. This was the bedrock of the Soviet design for victory. It was superior operational design that enabled the Red Army to eviscerate a usually tactically superior Wehrmacht. Of course, an army’s success was a product of cumulative tactical successes, but the conditions which made these possible, including surprise, the generation of required force ratios, etc were created at army and higher levels. A reverse for a division, let alone a regiment, would be a minor matter recoverable through effective action by army. Defeat of an army, at least on an important axis, could seriously impact the campaign and failure by an army group would likely be fatal to it. This thinking stressed the synergies to be found in treating the campaign as    a whole and not merely as the sum of its parts, whereas AFCENT for a long time viewed the campaign to come as a series of largely separate corps battles with higher levels retaining only limited resources to influence the outcome.

The British and US militaries became conscious of operational art only in the 1980s, half a century after the Soviet establishment of the General Staff Academy to develop, refine and teach the subject.[v] That they did so was due primarily to the work of the Soviet Studies Research Centre in Camberley and its American counterpart, the Soviet Army Studies Office in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The former was created in 1973 and developed thanks to the vision of a handful of far-sighted generals, especially Anthony Farrar-Hockley, Michael Gow and Nigel Bagnall. Baqgnall was particularly important as he reached the highest positions and by the mid-eighties was driving through radical reform to make the Army both maneuver-minded and capable and thus ready to take on the Soviets at their own game. The US Army noted the British developments and accepted their rationale. It created SASO, about a decade after SSRC was founded, to replicate and build on the work being done at Camberley.[vi] It was not long before the American military was going faster and further down the road to transformation.

As I reflected on our flawed understanding of the Soviet way in war, I went back over military history that I had read and came to see it in a new light. I realized how consistently, throughout history, so many armies have theorized about and trained for the wrong war and consequently achieved at best expensive and often indecisive victories or suffered catastrophic defeat. This was not always the result of a lack of professionalism. It was often the result of cultivating the wrong sort of professionalism for the war with which an army ended up. This is arguably what the British (and the Americans) have seen most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan where false analogies contributed to sub-optimal approaches: the British saw their successes in Malaya and Northern Ireland as providing models for counter-insurgencies in the 2000s, though the historical background, contemporary conditions and socio-political make up of Iraq and Afghanistan bore little resemblance to those of Malaya or Ulster.

There was a lesson for the future lurking here, and it is that lesson that I have tried to bring out in my book. I concentrate on war at the operational level with enough on the strategic and the tactical to provide context. I have compared and contrasted British, American and Soviet understanding of and approach to operations in the summer of 1944, making it clear that, like all armies, they were prisoners of their own experience. I analyze the course of operations over a limited period only, roughly July-September, because this was a period when linear-attritional, indecisive battle was succeeded by operational maneuver to potentially decisive effect. Strategically decisive results were indeed achieved in the East. They were not achieved in the West. I explain the main military reasons why the Soviets scored a more complete victory than the Allies, in doing so highlighting several factors not often dwelt on by western historians (who in any case mostly prefer narrative to analytical studies and who have mostly shied clear of comparisons). Some of the more important of these are briefly addressed below.

Contrary to popular myth, Soviet-German force ratios were not overwhelming; indeed, they were not generally more advantageous than Allied-German and were not, therefore, an explanation of greater Soviet success. Compare two contemporaneous operations in the West and in the East: the US Cobra and the British Bluecoat, starting respectively on 25 and 30 July, and the Red Army’s Belorussian and L’vov-Sandomir which commenced on 22 June and 13 July. The following table compares the force ratios on the first day of each. The two Soviet offensives both yielded great dividends, especially the larger Belorussian, quickly translating tactical into operational and then strategic success. The Americans, having (temporarily) abandoned their linear-attritional approach and aided by German logistic failure as a result of air interdiction, achieved operational success with unexpectedly far-reaching consequences. The British, having by contrast made no provision for deep exploitation, made only a limited impact.

Operation Operational Level Force Ratio (a)
Personnel Armour (a) Artillery
Cobra 3.8:1 4.7:1 3.0:1
Bluecoat 4.4:1 10.5:1 3.6:1
Belorussian 2.5:1 2.9:1 3.0:1
L’vov-Sandomir 1.7:1 2.2:1 2.5:1

Notes (a) Armour excludes light tanks; artillery includes guns and mortars over 80mm

The Soviets recognized that operational surprise to wrong-foot the Germans was all but a prerequisite for decisive success, not least because it enabled the concentration of superior forces, and they consistently put great efforts into achieving it. By 1944, deception and concealment routinely caused the Germans to miss over 50% of the Red Army’s offensive concentration: consequently they underestimated the build-up by 25-40%. This in turn meant that Soviet superiority estimated at an acceptable 2-3:1 was in fact up to 5:1 operationally and 8-10:1 tactically.[vii] After their brilliant achievement at the very start of the Normandy campaign, the Anglo-Americans were more intermittent in their efforts to achieve surprise and very often did not enjoy the benefits of this force multiplier.

Surprise was to become even more important, indeed a sine qua non, in modern conditions where deep and rapid penetration of the defense in a conventional phase would be vital to neutralize NATO tactical nuclear weapons. This would be accomplished by driving deep and fast, disrupting alliance command and control and logistics and by reducing the number of targets offered by a combination of shock, speed and intermingling of forces.

The Red Army consistently pursued the destruction of the enemy as the principal aim and therefore focus of operations. The capture and holding of ground would be an important by-product of the ruination of key enemy formations but not the primary mission. From its early days the Red Army’s obsession was to generate operational maneuver to decisive effect in order to escape from the indecisive, attritional battles that had characterized the period 1915-17 (especially in the west): twenty years of rich doctrinal debate culminated in Field Regulations, 1936 which systematized revolutionary concepts for war-fighting. The enemy’s cohesion was to be disrupted on a large scale, depriving him of his ability to react effectively to a rapidly changing situation by breaking up his organization and control of large formations. Destruction of large groupings, the paramount aim of a strategic offensive operation, would follow from the disruption of his plans, timetables and ability to organize over wide areas and in depth, forcing him into a generally reactive posture. In other words, Soviet operational art was not seen as merely a matter of teeing up and fighting battles. The Soviets did not move in order to fight. They fought usually in order to move, in order to generate and then maintain operational maneuver to force the enemy into a hopeless situation where his annihilation could be rapidly accomplished.

By the end of the summer 1944 campaign, the Red Army had eviscerated three German army groups. When the Allies invaded France in June 1944, the mission given to the supreme commander was to focus on the destruction of the German armed forces. By the end of August, the principal army group in the West had been very severely mauled. Thereafter however, the aim was somewhat lost to sight in practice as various territorial objectives offered prizes attractive to British and American commanders.[viii] Forces and increasingly scarce logistic resources were dissipated in various directions until their offensives ran out of steam short of strategically decisive objectives and with the German defense reviving.

The Soviets recognized the critical importance to the destruction of key enemy groupings of tempo and deep battle and, even more, deep operations penetrating without pauses 250-500 kilometers beyond the tactical zone of defense. Of course, before this became possible they had to break through usually well-developed, skillfully and tenaciously defended positions. They focused their efforts and demanded heavy sacrifices to achieve these complementary goals. Once the conditions were created for converting tactical into operational success, exploitation echelons were committed to drive deep, to hollow out the defense from within by disrupting German command and control and logistic support and seizing depth defense lines before they could be defended. By way of compensation for losses to the first echelon during the penetration of the tactical zone, the Soviets found that exploitation forces had an easier ride: when the rate of advance rose from 4-10 to 20-50 km per day, daily personnel losses fell by 30% and tank losses by 65% (and ammunition and fuel consumption fell dramatically as well).[ix] For the Red Army, the breakthrough battle was the most difficult and expensive phase of an operation and the exploitation was the payoff.

By contrast, shifting the center of gravity of combat into the enemy’s depth had no place in either British or US doctrine. Neither army created formations for this purpose at the operational level or worked hard or consistently to achieve it. While both accepted the desirability of achieving momentum, both saw casualty limitation as more important than unbalancing the enemy. Gnawing through the defense with the aid of overwhelming firepower was usually considered preferable to trading lives for time and tempo. Caution was generally seen as a virtue to be prized in Allied generals and George S Patton’s boldness troubled his superiors.

At the critical theatre and army group levels, the Allies were hampered by the weaknesses endemic in coalition war. American and British doctrinal differences vitiated mutual understanding and cooperation. So too did competition for resources.

Above all, differences over strategy, exacerbated by rivalries between commanders, meant that unity existed at only a superficial level. Not only were operations not always linked to produce synergies, they were frequently the product of rival British and US operational concepts. The result was dispersal of effort and a failure to keep the Germans under such sustained pressure on critical axes that their defeated army group collapsed completely under the strain. These problems were exacerbated by the fact that the British and American logistic systems were separate and both were designed to support linear-attritional rather than maneuver operations. While there was some cooperation between them, there was failure to ensure that clear alliance goals would determine priorities in meeting future logistic needs as the campaign progressed. There was dissipation of effort similar to that of combat forces which meant that ultimately, the Allies were unable to bring to bear their full combat power to complete the destruction of the enemy. The Soviets were not plagued by the need to accommodate allies and their totalitarian system kept rivalries between generals within tight bounds. In campaign design and in the setting up and conduct of each operation, best military judgment guided decisions and determined the need for switching of effort and logistic support between axes.

 

I hope I have said enough to demonstrate that my study of the theory and practice of war 70 years ago is not merely an academic, historical exercise. There are, as I bring out in the final chapter, enduring lessons to be learned about such issues as surprise and working within an alliance context. But the most important of these is the central importance of evolving correct doctrine for the war that an army will actually face rather than the one it would like. From doctrine flows equipment design and procurement, organization and training — how we propose to fight. Thus, for instance, the French went into battle in 1940 with utterly inappropriate doctrine and were speedily and comprehensively smashed. British and American doctrines were flawed and in 1944 this lengthened the struggle and raised the price of victory. Soviet doctrine at the start of their war was fundamentally sound but with lacunae. With modifications, it enabled them to survive horrendous initial defeats and then come back strongly to win convincing victories. Which armies today are producing doctrinal concepts that will provide the least wrong answers to the problems posed by the latest, greatest revolution in military affairs? Which have the mental and psychological flexibility best to adapt to the unanticipated mutations that war will undergo? The questioning study of history will not tell them what to think, but it will help them about to how to think. It might even help them to prove Hegel wrong.

C. J. Dick served in the British Army. After, he worked as a senior lecturer at the Soviet Studies Research Centre, which he directed from 1989–2004. From 2005–2006, he was a senior fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.

[i] CJ Dick, Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations, vol 1 From Victory to Stalemate, the Western Front Summer 1944 and vol 2 From Defeat to Victory, the Eastern Front Summer 1944 (University Press of Kansas, 2016)

[ii] There was much resistance to the idea that the Soviets could achieve surprise in the face of modern reconnaissance and surveillance means (despite the fact they did just that when invading Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979). The issue is dealt with, amongst other places, in C.J. Dick Catching NATO Unaware. International Defence Review 19, 1 (1986) and more recently in C.J.Dick, From Defeat to Victory, pp 270-272.

[iii]  When General Sir Rupert Smith took 1 (BR) Armoured Division to the Gulf in January 1991, he told me that he anticipated fighting meeting battles and urgently needed to teach and train the division for this unfamiliar form of combat. I sent him material on the Soviet concept and the following article: C.J. Dick, Soviet Battle Drills, International Defence Review 18, No.5 (1985)

[iv] There was a tendency to underestimate the effectiveness of Soviet air defence as a whole because of the relative lack of sophistication of many individual systems. This was to downplay the effect of sheer numbers. Although each weapon may have a low kill probability individually, quantity will tell; within a week, the RAF lost five of the 45 Tornados it took to the 1991 Gulf War to old weaponry manned by Iraqis.

[v] The relationship between the levels of war was succinctly described by AA Svechin as early as the 1920s: “Tactics makes the steps from which operational art leaps; strategy points out the path”.

[vi]  Israeli Brigadier Shimon Naveh traced the development of British and American operational thinking in his seminal study In Pursuit of Military Excellence — the Evolution of Operational Theory (Frank Cass, 1997), 273-274. In it he wrote: “Comprising talented scholars like C Donnelly, P Vigor, CJ Dick and John Erickson, the British research group, concentrated in the Centre for Soviet Studies [sic] exercised great impact on the perception of Soviet operational theory held by the American school of reformers. Being far ahead of their American colleagues in the study of Soviet deep operations, the British analysts managed to illuminate essential issues such as echeloning, operational breakthrough, simultaneous deep strike, momentum, deception and surprise. Moreover, aware of the conditions characterizing the Central European theatre, they managed to translate the abstract principles of Deep Operations theory into operational scenarios understood by the military planner. The organizational form and patterns of work that were developed by the British group later served their American counterparts as a model for both the establishment of the Soviet Army Study Office (SASO) in Fort Leavenworth, and the training of a talented generation of analysts who successfully researched Soviet operational theory.”

[vii] D.M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception (Frank Cass, 1989), 565.

[viii] Interestingly, the most important geographical objective for the longer term viability of the whole campaign, the Scheldt estuary, was neglected by the high command until too late to achieve its timely capture. Consequently, this vital port was opened 85 days after its capture (facilities intact). The issue is thoroughly explored in my first volume.

[ix] A.I. Radzievskiy, Tankoviy Udar (Tank Shock) (Voyenizdat, 1977), 228.

A Book Revisited: Vietnam; The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975 by John Prados

In April of 2009, the University Press of Kansas released the most comprehensive single-volume book about the Vietnam war. Author John Prados is an established freelance writer who excels in writing political and military history that appeals to both scholars and general readers. The Henry Adams Prize winner made extensive use of documentary sources and interviews, as well as his own experiences in the early 1970s.

The Vietnam war continues to be the focus of intense controversy. While most people—liberals, conservatives, Democrats, Republicans, historians, pundits, and citizens alike—agree that the United States did not win the war, a vocal minority argue the opposite or debate why victory never came, attributing the quagmire to everything from domestic politics to the press. The military never lost a battle, how then did it not win the war?

“A remarkable achievement [and] one of the most significant books published on Vietnam in the last decade.” – Journal of Military History

Stepping back from this overheated fray, bestselling author Prados takes a fresh look at both the war and the debates about it to produce a much-needed and long-overdue reassessment of one of our nation’s most tragic episodes. Drawing upon several decades of research-including recently declassified documents, newly available presidential tapes, and a wide range of Vietnamese and other international sources—Prados’s magisterial account weaves together multiple perspectives across an epic-sized canvas where domestic politics, ideologies, nations, and militaries all collide.

“An awe-inspiring achievement in epic form.” – Lloyd Gardner, author of Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam

Prados patiently pieces back together the events and moments, from the end of World War II until our dispiriting departure from Vietnam in 1975, that reveal a war that now appears to have been truly unwinnable—due to opportunities lost, missed, ignored, or refused. He shows how—from the Truman through the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations—American leaders consistently ignored or misunderstood the realities in Southeast Asia and passed up every opportunity to avoid war in the first place or avoid becoming ever more mired in it after it began. Highlighting especially Ike’s seminal and long-lasting influence on our Vietnam policy, Prados demonstrates how and why our range of choices narrowed with each passing year, while our decision-making continued to be distorted by Cold War politics and fundamental misperceptions about the culture, psychology, goals, and abilities of both our enemies and our allies in Vietnam.

By turns engaging narrative history, compelling analytic treatise, and moving personal account, Prados’s magnum opus challenges previous authors and should rightfully take its place as the most comprehensive, up-to-date, and accurate one-volume account of a war that—judging by the frequent analogies to the current war in Iraq—has not yet really ended for any of us.

“If you only had to have one book on the Vietnam War, this is the one.”  – The Veteran

A Book Revisited: When The Nazis Came to Skokie

In 1999 we published When the Nazis Came to Skokie: Freedom for the Speech We Hate, the third of six books written for UPK by Philippa Strum. The book was an immediate success and a standout in our Landmark Law Cases & American Society series. Recent events have thrust the book back into the spotlight and onto our list of best sellers.

When the Nazis Came to Skokie dramatically tells the story of a neo-Nazi group’s attempt in 1977 to hold a parade in Skokie, Illinois and analyzes its implications for the First Amendment.

In the Chicago suburb of Skokie, one out of every six Jewish citizens in the late 1970s was a survivor—or was directly related to a survivor—of the Holocaust. These victims of terror had resettled in America expecting to lead peaceful lives free from persecution. But their safe haven was shattered when a neo-Nazi group announced its intention to parade there in 1977. Philippa Strum’s dramatic retelling of the events in Skokie (and in the courts) shows why the case ignited such enormous controversy and challenged our understanding of and commitment to First Amendment values.

The debate was clear-cut: American Nazis claimed the right of free speech while their Jewish “targets” claimed the right to live without intimidation. The town, arguing that the march would assault the sensibilities of its citizens and spark violence, managed to win a court injunction against the marchers. In response, the American Civil Liberties Union took the case and successfully defended the Nazis’ right to free speech.

Skokie had all the elements of a difficult case: a clash of absolutes, prior restraint of speech, and heated public sentiment. In recreating it, Strum presents a detailed account and analysis of the legal proceedings as well as finely delineated portraits of the protagonists: Frank Collin, National Socialist Party of America leader and the son of a Jewish Holocaust survivor; Skokie community leader Sol Goldstein, a Holocaust survivor who planned a counterdemonstration against the Nazis; Skokie mayor Albert Smith, who wanted only to protect his townspeople; and ACLU attorney David Goldberger, caught in the ironic position of being a Jew defending the rights of Nazis against fellow Jews. While the ACLU did win the case, it was a costly victory-30,000 of its members left the organization. And in the end, ironically, the Nazis never did march in Skokie.

Forcefully argued, Strum’s book shows that freedom of speech must be defended even when the beneficiaries of that defense are far from admirable individuals. It raises both constitutional and moral issues critical to our understanding of free speech and carries important lessons for current controversies over hate speech on college campuses, inviting readers to think more carefully about what the First Amendment really means.

When an academic reviewer offered his evaluation of the manuscript he didn’t hold back.

“I started reading, and it is so well done that I just kept reading,” the reviewer wrote. “In sum, it is a gem of a book, and ought to be a best-seller as well as a prize-winner for the Press and the series.”

Why Vietnam was Unwinnable; An Essay

By Kevin Boylan, author of Losing Binh Dinh: The Failure of Pacification and Vietnamization, 1969-1971. This piece was originally published in the New York Times.

While I was working for the Pentagon in the early 2000s, wounded veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan were routinely bused down from Walter Reed Hospital, in Northwest Washington, D.C., to receive their medals. It was a heart-rending experience to see these young men and women, many of them missing eyes, arms, legs or even multiple limbs, being wheeled through the building.

As a trained military historian who had specialized in the Vietnam War, I couldn’t help thinking about that earlier conflict as I watched them slowly making their way down the Pentagon’s corridors. And I wasn’t the only one. Many prominent figures in the government, military and media were drawing parallels with the Vietnam War, and a surprising number of them suggested that its lessons offered hope for victory in Iraq.

Those who made this argument contended that the United States had been on the verge of winning in Vietnam, but threw its chance for victory away because of negative press and a resulting failure of political will at home. This “lost victory” thesis originated with the Nixon administration and its supporters back in the 1970s, but gained considerable traction in the 1980s and ’90s after it was taken up by a group of influential revisionist historians, including Mark Moyar and Lewis S. Sorley III.

Taking their cue from the Vietnam revisionists, Iraq war optimists argued that just as Americans thought we were losing in Vietnam when in fact we were winning, so too were we winning in Iraq despite apparent evidence to the contrary. The problem, the optimists argued, was that — just as during the Vietnam War — naysaying pundits and politicians were not merely undermining popular support for the war, but giving our enemies hope that they could win by waiting for the American people to lose their will to continue the fight.

This kind of talk alarmed me because it discouraged a frank reassessment of our failing strategy in Iraq, which was producing that weekly procession of maimed veterans. And I also knew that the historical premises on which it was based were deeply flawed. America did not experience a “lost victory” in Vietnam; in fact, victory was likely out of reach from the beginning.

There is a broad consensus among professional historians that the Vietnam War was effectively unwinnable. Even the revisionists admit their minority status, though some claim that it’s because of a deep-seated liberal bias within the academic history profession. But doubts about the war’s winnability are hardly limited to the halls of academe. One can readily find them in the published works of official Army historians like Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke, whose book “Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973” highlights the irrevocable problems that frustrated American policy and strategy in South Vietnam. Pessimism also pervades “Vietnam Declassified: The C.I.A. and Counterinsurgency,” a declassified volume of the agency’s secret official history penned by Thomas L. Ahern Jr., a career C.I.A. operations officer who served extensively in Indochina during the war.

In contrast, the revisionist case rests largely on the assertion that our defeat in Vietnam was essentially psychological, and that victory would therefore have been possible if only our political leadership had sustained popular support for the war. But although psychological factors and popular support were crucial, it was Vietnamese, rather than American, attitudes that were decisive. In the United States, popular support for fighting Communism in South Vietnam started strong and then declined as the war dragged on. In South Vietnam itself, however, popular support for the war was always halfhearted, and a large segment (and in some regions, a majority) of the population favored the Communists.

The corrupt, undemocratic and faction-riven South Vietnamese government — both under President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was assassinated in a 1963 coup, and under the military cliques that followed him — proved incapable of providing its people and armed forces a cause worth fighting for. Unfortunately for the United States and the future happiness of the South Vietnamese people, the Communists were more successful: By whipping up anti-foreign nationalist sentiment against the “American imperialists” and promising to reform the corrupt socio-economic system that kept most of the country’s citizens trapped in perpetual poverty, they persuaded millions to fight and die for them.

This asymmetry was the insurmountable stumbling block on the road to victory in Vietnam. Defeating the Communist guerrillas would have been an easy matter if the South Vietnamese people had refused to hide them in their midst. Instead, American and South Vietnamese could only grope after the elusive enemy and were rarely able to fight him except on his own terms.

And even as American soldiers began pouring into the country in 1965, there were already enough South Vietnamese troops on hand that they should have been able to defend it on their own. After all, the South Vietnamese forces outnumbered the Communists, were far better supplied, had vastly superior firepower and enjoyed a considerable advantage in mobility thanks to transport planes and helicopters. But their Achilles’ heel was their weak will to fight — and this shortcoming was never overcome.

Some years after the war ended, Lt. Gen. Arthur S. Collins, who had commanded all American troops in the central region of South Vietnam from February 1970 to January 1971, told an Army historian: “I didn’t think there was any way that South Vietnam could survive, no matter what we did for them. What put the final nail in the coffin, from my point of view, was when I learned from questioning [South Vietnamese] general officers that almost without exception their sons were in school in France, Switzerland, or the U.S. If they weren’t going to fight for South Vietnam, who was?”

Despite its ally’s fundamental weakness, the United States might possibly still have won, of course, had it been willing to fully mobilize its own national power. But that would have required raising taxes, calling up the Reserves and other sacrifices that President Lyndon Johnson shrank from asking the American people to make.

In a recent New York Times article, Mr. Moyar, the revisionist historian, decried “the absence of presidential cheerleading” and took Johnson to task for failing to create a “war psychology” that would have made Vietnam into a patriotic crusade (and presumably silenced the war’s critics). Mr. Moyar argued, “The public’s turn against the war was not inevitable; it was, rather, the result of a failure by policy makers to explain and persuade Americans to support it.”

But Johnson was the most astute politician to sit in the White House during the 20th century, and he knew that he faced a paradox. As long as the war in Vietnam didn’t demand too much of them and they believed that victory was just around the corner, most Americans would support it. But if Johnson admitted publicly that South Vietnam could not survive without a full commitment by the United States, he knew that support would crumble.

Such a move would reveal the war’s unpleasant truths: that South Vietnam’s government was an autocratic kleptocracy, that its military was reluctant to fight, that much of its population willingly supported the Communists, that North Vietnam was matching our escalation step by step, that Johnson had committed the country to war without having a plan to win it and that the Pentagon had no real idea when it would be won. And Johnson knew full well that if the public turned against the war, it would reject his leadership and cherished Great Society domestic agenda as well.

So like other presidents before and after him, Johnson tried to conceal the bleak realities of Vietnam from the American people and deliberately misled them about the war’s likely duration and cost. Just about the last thing he wanted was to engender a wartime psychology — much less call for full mobilization. The Communists didn’t need American journalists and antiwar protesters to reveal that public enthusiasm for the war was fragile. Johnson’s refusal to raise taxes or call up the Reserves had made that obvious from the outset — just as our failure to impose new taxes or enact a military draft since 9/11 signals our enemies that America’s will to fight is weak.

Although the United States undoubtedly had the means to prevail in Vietnam, the war was unwinnable at the level of commitment and sacrifice that our nation was willing to sustain. As the renowned historian George Herring put it, the war could not “have been ‘won’ in any meaningful sense at a moral or material cost most Americans deemed acceptable.”

Perhaps the key lesson of Vietnam is that if the reasons for going to war are not compelling enough for our leaders to demand that all Americans make sacrifices in pursuit of victory, then perhaps we should not go to war at all. Sacrifice should not be demanded solely of those who risk life and limb for their country in combat theaters overseas.

Kevin Boylan is a military historian at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh and the author of “Losing Binh Dinh: The Failure of Pacification and Vietnamization, 1969-1971.” He worked for the Department of Defense and Army staff’s War Plans Division from 1995 to 2005.

Charlottesville Curriculum, via the University Press of Kansas

Acquisitions editors Kim Hogeland and Joyce Harrison have created a preliminary reading list of UPK titles related to the past week’s events in Charlottesville, race relations and civil rights.

Gospel According to the Klan: The KKK’s Appeal to Protestant America, 1915-1930 by Kelly J. Baker

This engrossing exposé looks closely at the Klan’s definition of Protestantism, its belief in a strong relationship between church and state, its notions of masculinity and femininity, and its views on Jews and African Americans. The book also examines in detail the Klan’s infamous 1924 anti-Catholic riot at Notre Dame University and draws alarming parallels between the Klan’s message of the 1920s and current posturing by some Tea Party members and their sympathizers.

 

Republicans and Race: The GOP’s Frayed Relationship with African Americans, 1945-1974 by  Timothy N. Thurber

But since 1964, no Republican presidential candidate has attracted more than 15 percent of the black electorate, and few GOP candidates for other offices have fared much better. No segment of the American electorate is more reliably Democratic than African Americans. The GOP, meanwhile, remains nearly an all-white party. In this path-breaking book, historian Timothy Thurber illuminates the deep roots of this gulf by exploring the contentious, and sometimes surprising, relationship between African Americans and the Republican Party from the end of World War II through Richard Nixons presidency. The GOP, he shows, shaped the modern civil rights movement, but the struggle for racial equality also transformed the GOP.

 

Honoring the Civil War Dead: Commemoration and the Problem of Reconciliation by John R. Neff

Neff contends that the significance of the Civil War dead has been largely overlooked and that the literature on the war has so far failed to note how commemorations of the dead provide a means for both expressing lingering animosities and discouraging reconciliation. Commemoration—from private mourning to the often extravagant public remembrances exemplified in cemeteries, monuments, and Memorial Day observances—provided Americans the quintessential forum for engaging the wars meaning.

 

The Cause Lost: Myths and Realities of the Confederacy by William C. Davis

Davis also illustrates why the cause of the war—a subject of long-standing controversy—boils down to the single issue of slavery; why Southerners, ninety percent of whom didn’t own slaves, were willing to join in the battle to defend their homeland; how the personalities, tactics, and styles of the armies in the turbulent West differed greatly from those in the East; what real or perceived turning points influenced Southern decision making; and how mythology and misinterpretations have been perpetuated through biography, history, literature, and film. Revealing the Confederacy’s myths for what they really are, Davis nevertheless illustrates how much those myths inform our understanding of the Civil War and its place in Southern and American culture.

 

Dred Scott and the Politics of Slavery by Earl M. Maltz

The slave Dred Scott claimed that his residence in a free state transformed him into a free man. His lawsuit took many twists and turns before making its way to the Supreme Court in 1856. But when the Court ruled against him, the ruling sent shock waves through the nation and helped lead to civil war.

 

Plessy v. Ferguson: Race and Inequality in Jim Crow America by Williamjames Hull Hoffer

Hoffer’s compelling reconstruction illuminates the controversies and impact of Plessy v. Ferguson for a new generation of students and other interested readers. It also pays tribute to a group of little known heroes from the Deep South who failed to hold back the tide of racial segregation but nevertheless laid the groundwork for a less divided America.

 

Race, Sex, and the Freedom to Marry: Loving v. Virginia by Peter Wallenstein

In 1958 Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving, two young lovers from Caroline County, Virginia, got married. Soon they were hauled out of their bedroom in the middle of the night and taken to jail. Their crime? Loving was white, Jeter was not, and in Virginia—as in twenty-three other states then—interracial marriage was illegal. Their experience reflected that of countless couples across America since colonial times. And in challenging the laws against their marriage, the Lovings closed the book on that very long chapter in the nation’s history. Race, Sex, and the Freedom to Marry tells the story of this couple and the case that forever changed the law of race and marriage in America.

 

Murder in Mississippi: United States v. Price and the Struggle for Civil Rights by Howard Ball

Howard Ball reminds us just how problematic the prosecution of the murderers—all members of the KKK—actually was. When the State of Mississippi failed to indict them, the U.S. tried to prosecute the case in federal district court. The judge there, however, ruled that the federal government had no jurisdiction and so dismissed the case. When the U.S. appealed, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned the lower court decision, claiming that federal authorities did indeed have the power to police civil rights violations in any state. United States v. Price (1967) thus produced a landmark decision that signaled a seismic shift in American legal history and race relations, for it meant that local authorities could no longer shield racist lawbreakers.